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Abstract 
This study examines the case of Romanian IFRS adopters when it comes about their auditors. After a brief literature review 
in which we point out some of the previous articles published by both Romanian and international researchers on the topic 
of IFRS and audit market concentration, we analyze the case of Romanian listed companies, before and after they switch to 
IFRS. In order to take a picture of the market share we identified the listed companies and their auditors and also we have 
analyze the audit report issued in order to see if a change in the auditor’s opinion is a incentive for the reporting entity to 
change the auditors. Our hypothesis is that for the most of the companies – companies not requiring highly specialized 
qualification from the auditors, such as, for example, financial institutions - the adoption of IFRS implied a change in the 
auditors.  In the last part we will compare Romanian audit market with other audit markets such as with the British, Chinese 
and American market and we try to explain our findings. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the time, both advantages and disadvantages of auditing financial statements by using Big 4 auditors 
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have started passionate debates. Some considered that the quality offered by a Big 4 company is superior to the 
one received by using a smaller company. This quality was justified by more resources available ( human 
resources, specialized software and financial resources), expertise, experience, knowledge, good quality control 
procedures, credibility and many other. DeAngelo (1981), Fung & others are promoters of the idea that there is 
increased audit quality in case of Big 4 companies. On the other hand, all the other audit companies complained 
that it was very difficult if not impossible to have access to more important clients ( for example financial 
institutions, listed companies and so on) due to the barriers created on audit markets for such companies. It is 
our opinion that, when it comes to public interest companies, Big 4 auditors created oligopoly. This is bad for 
audited companies as it prevents competition (at least from medium sized audit companies) so the quality is not 
improved over the time and also is bad as it may lead to unjustified audit fees. 
More and more countries, at least from Europe, consider the opportunity of enforcing auditor’s rotation and 
joint audits (or dual uaidts) for public interest companies. One of the reasons is that local auditors, most of 
them small and medium sized practices, should be protected. Another reason might be the attempt to break up 
Big 4’s oligopoly and to allow wider competition in order to increase quality and to allow audit fees to be 
settled on the free market. Some of European Countries already enforced joint audits (for example Italy). 
In Romania we may find on the audit market all the Big 4 companies and some other companies belonging 
to international networks of accountancy companies. There are also many local audit companies, not affiliated 
to any international network (972 audit companies in 2012 and 4,251 auditors were reported for Romania). 
Joint audits are not mandatory yet. 
Starting with 2012 almost all listed companies (on Bucharest Stock Exchange) were forced by law to adopt 
IFRS. Before, they were supposed to report according to Romanian GAAP and present IFRS financial 
statements only for investors’ needs or if they presented consolidated financial statements. 
 This study examines the case of Romanian IFRS adopters when it comes about their auditors. We analyzed 
the case of Romanian listed companies, before and after they switch to IFRS. In order to take a picture of the 
market share we identified the listed companies and their auditors and also we have analyze the audit report 
issued in order to see if a change in the auditor’s opinion is a incentive for the reporting entity to change the 
auditors. Our hypothesis is that for the most of the companies the adoption of IFRS implied a change in the 
auditors.  In the last part we will compare Romanian audit market with other audit markets such as with the 
British, Chinese and American market and we try to explain our findings.  
2. Literature review 
In only few words we acknowledge some of the previous research which was done with regard to the audit 
market concentration.  
Simunic in US (1980) was among the first to analyze the audit market in order to see if Big 8 auditors 
charged a premium for their fee or not.  Back then, Big 4 companies were Big 8 companies (four of them were 
involved in mergers and acquisitions or were closed). His studies mentioned the number of audited clients and 
the repartition between Big 8 and Non Big 8 auditors.  Later on, he also researched audit market concentration. 
Soon after, Francis and Simon (1987) conducted a research also on the US audit market and proved that in 
their opinion, regardless the previous contradictory findings, Big 4 Company’s do perceive premiums when it 
came to audit fees. They presented all together different results reported over the time. It is easy to see that if 
for 1977 Simunic (1980) reported that from 164 large companies surveyed only 38 were audited by non Big 8 
auditors and 164 were audited by Big 8 companies (23% as opposed to 77%), in 1985 Palmrose (1985) 
reported for 1980-1981 only 7 audited by Non Big 8 companies from 184 (which is 4% while Big 8 covered 
96% from the large audited companies). 
Later Simon (1985) reported that during 1978-1983 from 173 large companies only 36 were audited by Non 
Big 8 companies (which is 21% and it figures that Big 8 companies audited 79%). Francis (1984) reports 
contradictory findings for the Australian audit market during 1974-1978. He found out that from 68 large 
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companies 35 were audited by Non Big 8 companies (so the score is 51% for Non Big 8 -49% for Big 8 
companies). However the trend on this market is similar to the one in US few years later, Francis and Stokes ( 
1986) report for 1983 that only 25 from 96 large companies are audited by Non Big 4 ( the percent drop now to 
26%). 
For the audit market in Great Britain, Taffler and Ramalinggam (1982) report that only 73 from 192 large 
companies are audited by Non Big 8 auditors (this is 38%).  
More recently, Velte and Stiglbauer conducted a research on audit market concentration in Europe and its 
impact on audit quality. They also carried out an extensive literature review and reported the finding on audit 
market concentration over the years in many European countries. For example, in Germany, they cited 
Moeller/Hoellbacher (2009), Koehler et. al. (2010) and Sattler (2011) which examined the time period 2005-
2007 and found out that the audit market is dominated by Big 4 companies (which owned 93% from the share 
market based on the audit fee). 
For UK, they mention Abidin, Beattie, Goodacre (2010) which determined for 1998-2003 an increasing 
concentration over time based on audit fees. For Switzerland, Breitkreuz/Mueßig (2010) were mentioned and 
they stated that the Swiss audit market is divided between the Big Three as Deloitte has a only minor market 
share, while the rest of the Big 4 have over time a relative consistent market share of approximately 95%.  
Gerakos and Syverson (2014) presented the results for audit market concentration in US over the years 2002 
– 2010 for those companies within three-digit SIC industries. Based on the number of clients, the share market 
for Non Big $4 auditors starts from 17.3% but increases up to 32.9% in 2010. So the power of Big 4 appears to 
be diminishing over time. If however we analyze to market share based on the audit fee, we notice the same 
trend ( an increase in the share market for non Big 4 companies) however the market share is significantly 
lower than the one computed based on the number of clients ( it starts from 3.15% in 2012 and raises up to 
5.3% in 2010). 
More recently, Ferguson, Pinnuck and Skinner (2013) report for Australia an increased market share over 
the years for Big 4 companies ( from 88% in 1997 for Big 6 companies to 93% in 2002 and 90% in 2007) and 
also the existence of audit fee premiums but only in case of small companies. Hay and Jeter (2008) reported 
similar share markets for Big 4 companies ( 88%) for 2003. 
 Toscano and García-Benau (2014) found that for the Mexican market, based on the volume by audited 
companies billing, 97% is the cumulated share market for the Big 4 companies during 2000-2007 ( it is a higly 
concentrated). 
For Romania, Le Vourc’h and Morand (2011) discover that the concentration is high (a HHI index on 
2,400 and CR 4 – 80%, both computed based on the turnover). However, other countries reported more 
concentrated audit markets, for example Estonia, Slovenia and Germany. If we refer to the same indexes but we 
computed based on the number of mandates, the concentration level is not that high (290  for HHI and 28% for 
CR 4). This shows us that audit fees received by Big 4 companies are on average higher than audit fees 
received by others. 
In Romania, Berinde (2013) divided auditors in 3 classes ( Big 4. Non Big 4 and individuals) and found 
out that Big Four auditors will experience an ascending trend in terms of market share as opposed to local audit 
companies. We explain belowe why e have classified auditors in 4 groups and not three for our research. 
Grosanu and Berinde (2013) found for a number of large companies from North-West of Romania that Big 
4 companies only covered 18% from the entities in their sample. They also mentioned some factors which they 
consider highly motivating for audited companies to ask for Big 4 auditors, such as investors ( local or foreign) 
and managers and their desire for credibility. Our results contradicts theirs in respect of the share market for 
Big 4 companies, however we have only analyzed listed companies as opposed to their case. 
3. Research methodology and results 
For the years 2011-2013 we have analyzed the audit reports of Romanian listed companies (listed on 
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Bucharest Stock Exchange). The two companies which were not Romanian companies were removed from the 
population. 2012 was the first year when it was mandatory for most of the Romanian listed companies to report 
according to IFRS and to abandon Romanian GAAP. Our initial aim was to see what the structure of the 
Romanian audit market was and to compare it to the ones reported for other countries. The hypothesis we 
tested was that, as a result of mandatory application of IFRS a significant number of companies switched from 
a non Big 4 company to one of the Big 4. Surprisingly, our hypothesis was not validated by our findings. 
In 2013 and 2012 there were 82 companies for which we were able to identify audit reports. For 2011 only 
79 audit reports were identified. For three companies we were unable to find published financial statements 
after more than reasonable efforts. 
For all the audit reports we have classified auditors in 4 groups: Big 4 companies, other large international 
companies, local companies and sole traders. Obviously Big 4 companies are made of Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (PWC), KPMG, Deloitte and Touche Tohmatsu (Deloitte) and Ernst and Young (EY). Other large 
international companies group together all subsidiaries of companies which are ranked in TOP 40 international 
networks, association and alliances by Accountancy Age. Local companies – this group stands for other 
Romanian audit companies, affiliated or not to an international network (but not one from the Top 40 list).  
It is to be noticed that we used 4 classes instead of three which were used by, for example, Berinde in 2013. 
We have chosen to monitor companies belonging to other Top 40 international networks in order to observe if 
they are likely to form an independent category, different by both local small companies and Big 4 Companies. 
DeAngelo (1981) promoted the idea that audit quality is not independent of the auditor’s size. We alos 
considere them as being more “equipped” to act as auditors on capital market due to some advantages that local 
company do not have. First, they have the knowledge and resources shared by their network, they have a better 
quality control system (which is also imposed by the network they belong to) and, secondly and very important, 
for multinational groups, as long as the parent of one company is audited by an auditor belonging to the 
network, it is more likely for subsidiaries to also be audited by local auditors belonging to that network. So we 
imagine they should be better represented on the Romanian capital market than local companies. However, 
their share market is less than the local companies’ one.   
Also surprisingly, some of the Romanian listed companies are audited by sole traders. Surprisingly because 
usually sole traders do not have the resources needed to audit a listed company (as long as many authors 
underlined the advantages of Big 4 companies from which expertise, resources, quality and so on - using the 
services of a free lancer seems kind of at the opposite side). Listed companies are most of the times very 
complex, widespread, risky (in terms of business risk, stakeholders monitoring performance, gearing, 
regulation imposed by official bodies and so on). If one considers the risks assumed by the auditor in case of a 
mal praxis lawsuit and also the fact that sole traders might be fully responsible for any damage caused by one 
of their mistake (unintentional or not) it seems even more difficult to understand how is it possible and in such 
a large extent for sole traders to audit listed companies. In Romania, sole traders have unlimited liability. They 
have a duty to be insured; however it is difficult for someone to claim back from the insurance company any 
supposed damages paid to a client. It is common for individuals to charge less than companies ( one of the 
reasons being less administrative costs they bear). However, damages may exceed significantly any audit fee 
received, which means that the economic risk faced by individual auditors is very high. This risk should be 
incorporated in the audit fee, but again, in order to be competitive, they count on reduced audit fees. 
On the other hand, even for stakeholders are more risky if the company they are interested in is audited by 
an individual. This is because in case of any damages they may not be able to recover their loss. On top of this, 
part of the auditor’s value is the image and credibility he brings to financial statements prepared by 
management. 
 A reason for this anomaly might be the audit fee which is expected to be lower in case of audit companies 
which are not considered payers in “the first league”.  
After a preliminary view of the results, we decided to analyzed if, for companies changing auditor, the 
change had anything to do with an opinion other than unqualified ( such as a qualified opinion, an adverse 
opinion or a disclaimer of an opinion). We find no link between changing the auditors and a modified audit 
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opinion issued by the former ones. We also tried to see if, in cases of companies changing auditors, the change 
was made to a more “better perceived” auditor or not. A better perceived auditor would be one in a superior 
class, for example we considered that a Big 4 company is “better perceived” than a company that has only local 
recognition or a sole trader. 
By analyzing the auditor’s reports we were able to identify that the market share for Big 4 companies is 
increasing over time. From 40.51% in 2011 (based on the audit reports we were able to identify) to 41,46 % in 
2012 and 42.68 % in 2013. 2012 was the first year for listed companies to apply IFRS but the market share 
owned by Big 4 companies only increased by 2.36% (2012 to 2011) and by almost 3% in 2013 to 2012. Those 
figures were computed based on the number of listed company. 
The market share for other international companies, members in Top 40 remained mostly unchanged ( from 
9% in 2011, moved to 13.4% in 2012 and remained the same in 2013). 
As for the share market owned by each company from the Big 4 group, in 2011 leaders were Deloitte and 
KPMG (with 12.82 % each) followed by EY (10.13%) and PWC (5.13%). In 2012 the structure has changed. 
PWC lost part of its share market ( it decreased down to 3.66%) but same happened with KPMG (it decreased 
down to 10.98%) which lead to the situation of Deloitte being the leader ( with 14.63% from the audit market) 
and EY being the second biggest one (with 12.20%). 
In 2013, both PWC and EY remained with the same number of audit listed companies, while KPMG 
became the leader (14,63%) and Deloitte – the second best (12.2%). 
The top we created is not in line with the TOP 40 we mention before, which present PWC as the leader, 
followed by Deloitte, EY and KPMG (when it comes about the income from assurance and accounting). 
However, this may only mean that the number of Romanian listed companies audited by Big 4 companies is 
not in line with their size judged based on global income from accounting and assurance services. 
As a conclusion, the most of the auditors belong to Big 4 companies and Romanian companies, other than 
companies belonging to the first 40 Top companies (we’ll call them local companies in the rest of this article). 
As a trend we saw that local companies audited in 2011 42.3% of Romanian listed companies but their market 
share decreased in 2012 to 36.6% and even more in 2013 down to 34.2%. Their clients were gained by Big 4 
companies. Meanwhile the number of Romanian sole traders auditors remained pretty unchanged during 2011-
2013 (2011 – 9%, 2012 – 8.5%, 2013 – 10%). 
As for the second class of auditors (local companies belonging to Top 40 international networks) we have 
spotted some differences. Even their market share (based on the number of audited company) is not comparable 
to the one for local companies, considering that their number is significantly lower than the one for local 
auditors; they do represent a powerful group. In 2011 they have audited 8.86% from the listed company and 
this percent increased in 2012 to 13.41% and remained stable for 2013. The number of auditors in this class 
was stable ( 4 auditors) during the years surveyed. They audited together 7 companies in 2011 and 11 in 2012 
and 2013. BDO, one of the auditors in this group, reported in 2013 6 listed clients, which is more than what 
PWC, one of the Big 4 company, reported. Another one (JP Auditors and Advisers) reported 3 listed companies 
in 2013. Meanwhile, with only few exceptions, local auditors reported only one listed company as audited 
client during 2011-2013. 
Further, we have also tried to analyze the opinion issued by different types of auditors. The results were also 
unexpected. From the beginning we image that is more unlikely for a (small) local audit company and even for 
an individual to issue a modified opinion for a listed company. More unlikely due to the pressure which could 
be exercised over them by the management of the company or even by their own desire to keep their clients. 
Also, discrepancies between the financial power of audited company and the auditor may make the life of the 
auditor more difficult when it comes to disputes with those in charge with corporate governance. We refer 
strictly to the ability of companies to hire consultants or other specialists aimed to protect their point of view. 
However, the results show us that the types of opinions are pretty correlated between classes of auditors. 
Individuals, on average, issue with 18% more unqualified opinions that Big 4 companies. 
Before moving further, we must highlight the fact that we classified opinions in four groups: unqualified 
(regardless if the audit report was modified by an emphasis of a matter paragraph or another matter paragraph), 
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qualified, adverse and disclaimer of opinion. 
From our findings in 2011 Big 4 companies issued an unqualified opinion for almost 71% of their clients 
and sole traders for 86% of their clients while local companies issued in 85% an unqualified opinion. In 201, in 
81% cases, companies received an unqualified opinion. 
In 2012, in spite of the IFRS adoption, the percentage of unqualified opinion decreased for all of the 
auditors but increased for Big 4 companies- 73.5%. Individuals reported the same percent for unqualified 
opinions as in 2011 – 86%. For local companies the percentage decreased to 77% and it became more closely 
to the one reported for Big 4 companies. We expected that the percentage of unqualified opinions to decrease ( 
it decreased to 72% from 81%) as the process in Romania was not very smoothly. Romanian listed companies 
found out officially only in October 2012 that there are supposed to present financial statements according to 
IFRS for 2012, the opening year being 2011. We imagined that a lot of data needed to restate financial 
statements and current accounting records from RO-GAAP to IFRS was not available to entities so this might 
have lead to qualified opinions or even disclaimer of opinions in cases where the limitations were severe. That 
was not the case as we could have seen by reading the audit reports. Banks were not in this situations as they 
knew about the IFRS adoptions and they have applied IFRS with a least a year before most of the rest of 
companies to apply them. 
As an observation, all listed banks were audited by Big 4 companies. Listed investment companies ( six in 
total) were audited by Big 4 companies ( four of them) and 2 by second tier audit companies ( belonging to Top 
40). 
However, once we went to a deeper analysis of the audit reports we found out that the percentage of 
unqualified opinions decreased as a result to uncertainties or other misstatements and not as a result to IFRS 
adoption. 
In 2013, the percentage of unqualified opinion increased a little bit up to 73.17%. That year, the percents 
reported by Big 4 companies, local companies and sole traders for unqualified opinions issued were even more 
closely related. Big 4 companies issued in 74 % of the cases an unqualified opinion, local companies in 76% 
and sole traders in 86%. 
As for the second tier companies ( those belonging to international networks of accounting companies, other 
than Big 4 companies, reported in Top 40) we consider that their results are not relevant as the number of 
observations is too small to be representative. 
As for the change in auditors, in 2012 the auditors changed for fourteen companies (for 3 other companies 
we do not know who was the previous auditor) and in 2013 for nine companies. From the information we had 
in only two cases a company changed its auditors both in 2012 and 2013 ( and apparently it had nothing to do 
with the audit opinion at least in 2011 when both companies reported an unqualified opinion), in the rest of the 
cases the auditor was changed only once during 2011-2013. 
Further we have tried to see if there is a link between a qualified opinion received by an entity and the 
change of auditors. Basically, for all the companies changing its auditors we analyzed if in the previous year of 
change the audit opinion another one than an unqualified one.  From 2011 to 2013 in only five cases ( out of 
23) we found that in the previous year of change the audit opinion was modified so apparently the change is not 
as closely related to the opinion as we believed. 
The last feature we examined in order to test our supposition referred to the change in auditors. We tried to 
see if the change occurred if it occurred in favor of an auditor “better perceived” or not.  
We expected that if a change in auditors occurred that change to be for an auditor belonging to at least the 
same group (according to our classification) if not a superior one. Our assumption was actually confirmed. In 
2012 most of the reported cases of change in auditors were to one from the same class ( eight out of fourteen ). 
A change in favor of a better class were observed for four cases and for only two companies we have noticed 
that the new auditor came from a “lower class” ( in all cases the outgoing auditor was a Big 4 company and the 
new one was a company from Top 40 ). 
In 2013 we have the same picture. From nine changes - five were to auditors from the same class, and two 
were in favor of an auditor from a better class. Also two were to an auditor from a lower class.  
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4. Summary and conclusions 
The main objective of this study has been to see what the structure of Romanian audit market in case of 
listed companies was and to see if that structure is consistent with those reported by other researcher for 
developing economies. 
We found out that around 40 % of the listed companies are being audited by Big 4 companies, while local 
auditors cover around 35% (their share market decreased over time from 42% in 2011 to 37 % in 2012 and 34 
% in 2013). These numbers do not include auditors from the second tier of auditors (other companies belonging 
to Top 40 international networks). 
This percent is significantly lower than those percents reported for other countries in European countries 
(for example UK, Germany, Estonia, Slovenia or other). Also, the Romanian audit market is not as 
concentrated as the Australian audit market (as reported by Hay and Jeter (2008)). On the other side, many 
others reported that the influence on the Chinese audit market from Big 4 companies is decreasing over the 
time (due to local auditor’s protections, mergers and acquisitions among local auditors and aggressive local 
competition, among others). The Romanian audit market for listed companies is still dominated by Big 4 
auditors and the trend is for them to expand even more. However, on the British audit market, the level of 
concentration is significantly higher (CR 4 is 55% computed based on the number of mandates, as opposed to 
28% in Romania, and HHI is 969 as opposed to 290 in Romania). On the other hand, according to Le Vourc’h 
and Morand (2011) the share market in general in 14% for Big 4 companies in Romania and 40% in UK. This 
discrepancy might be due to an increase desire of audited companies to reduce as much as possible audit costs. 
Individuals/sole traders cover around 9 % from the listed companies while other companies belonging to 
TOP 40 international networks, association and alliances by Accountancy Age (second tier) cover around 13%. 
We explained why we consider this case to be an anomaly. 
 The hypothesis we tested was that, in the light of IFRS adoption, an increased number of listed companies 
switched from a local auditor to a Big 4 company. Our findings proved we were wrong as the share market 
increased in favor of Big 4 companies by around only 3% both in 2012 and 2013. On the other hand, the 
number of new clients gained by second tier auditors increased in 2012 by 50%. Cumulatively, both for Big 4 
and second tier auditors, the number of client increased by 15%, which is less than we expected, considering 
that more than 10% from the listed companies are still audited by individuals / sole traders. 
We also analyzed to see if the change in auditors might be due to a modified opinion but in only 5 cases out 
of 23 the opinion received from the outgoing auditor was modified. So we concluded the opinion is not the 
primary reason for a change in auditors. 
Our research also revealed that in most of the cases the new auditor belongs at least to the same category of 
auditors as the old one ( if the old auditor was a Big 4 company is more likely for the new one to be from the 
same class and not a local audit company). 
And last but not least, we expected to find out that the qualified opinions are more frequent between listed 
companies after IFRS adoption, especially considering the process imposed by Romanian Finance Ministry to 
such entities. Our results showed that if in 2011 81% from the auditor’s reports presented unqualified opinion, 
in 2012 only 72% were unqualified and in 2013 the number increased up to 73%.  
We also admit that there are limitations to our research, from which: the number of companies studied is 
low and the period of time covered is short. The number of companies is low as there are not so many 
Romanian companies listed to Bucharest Stock Exchange. We intend in the future to also analyze the rest of the 
companies listed on other stock exchanges such as on RASDAQ. 
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